Abstract. Among others, Alferes et al. (1998) presented an approach for updating logic programs with sets of rules based on dynamic logic programs. We syntactically redefine dynamic logic programs and investigate their semantical properties, looking at them from perspectives such as a belief revision and abstract consequence relation view. Since the approach does not respect minimality of change, we refine its stable model semantics and present minimal stable models and strict stable models. We also compare the update approach to related work, and find that is equivalent to a class of inheritance programs independently defined by Buccafurri et al. (1999) .
Introduction
In recent years, agent-based computing has gained increasing interest. The need for software agents that behave "intelligently" in their environment led to question for possibilities of equipping them with advanced reasoning capabilities.
The research on logic-based AI, and in particular the work on logic programming, has produced a number of approaches and methods from which we can take advantage for accomplishing this goal (see e.g. [11] ). It has been realized, however, that further work is needed for extending them to fully support that agents must adapt over time and adjust their decision making.
In a simple (but as for currently deployed agent systems, realistic) setting, an agent's knowledge base by considering the rules in more recent updates as more reliable.
While uses and extensions of dynamic logic programming have been discussed, cf. [5, 4, 20] , its properties and relationships to other approaches and related formalisms have been less explored (but see [4] ). The aim of this paper is to shed light on these issues, and help us to get a better understanding of dynamic logic programming and related approaches in logic programming.
The main contributions of our work can be summarized as follows.
-We syntactically redefine dynamic logic programs to equivalent update programs, for which stable models are defined. Update programs are slightly less involved and, as we believe, better reflect the working of the approach than the original definition of dynamic logic programs. For this, information about rule rejection is explicitly represented at the object level through rejection atoms. The syntactic redefinition, which reduces the type of rules in update programs, is helpful for establishing formal results about properties. -We investigate properties of update programs. We consider them from the perspective of belief revision, and review different sets of postulates that have been proposed in this area. We view update programs as nonmonotonic consequence operators, and consider further properties of general interest. As it turns out, update programs (and thus dynamic logic programs) do not satisfy many of the properties defined in the literature. This is partly explained by the nonmonotonicity of logic programs and the causal rejection principle embodied in the semantics, which strongly depends on the syntax of rules. -Dynamic logic programs make no attempt to respect minimality of change. We thus refine the semantics of update programs and introduce minimal stable models and strict stable models. Informally, minimal stable models minimize the set of rules that need to be rejected, and strict stable models further refine on this by assigning rules from a later update higher priority. -We compare update programs to alternative approaches for updating logic programs [13, 17] and related work on inheritance programs [9] . We find that update programs are equivalent to a class of inheritance programs. Thus, update programs (and dynamic logic programs) may be semantically regarded as fragment of the framework in [9] , which has been developed independently of [2, 5] . Our results on the semantical properties of update programs apply to this fragment as well.
Due to space reasons, the presentation is necessarily succinct and proofs are omitted. More details will be given in the full version of this paper.
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contains those rules from which are rejected on the basis of rules which are not rejected themselves.
We obtain the following characterization of stable models, mirroring a similar result given in [2] . 
Principles of Update Sequences
In this section, we discuss several kinds of postulates which have been advocated in the literature on belief change and examine to what extent update sequences satisfy these principles. This issue has not been addressed extensively in previous work [2, 3] . We first consider update programs from the perspective of belief revision, and assess the relevant postulates from this area. Afterwards, we briefly analyze further properties, like viewing update programs as nonmonotonic consequence operators and other general principles. 
Belief revision
. A belief base is a special case of an epistemic state [10] , which is a set of sentences 
is the revision and expansion operation, respectively, applied to AE . Informally, these postulates express that the new information should be reflected after the revision, and that the belief set should change as little as possible. As has been pointed, this set of postulates is appropriate for new information about an unchanged world, but not for incorporation of a change to the actual world. Such a mechanism is addressed by the next set of postulates, expressing update operations. 
Update Postulates
Here, conjunction and disjunction of epistemic states are presumed to be definable in the given language (like, e.g., in terms of intersection and union of associated sets of models, respectively).
The most important differences between (K1)-(K8) and (U1)-(U8) are that revision, if È is compatible with AE , should yield the same result as expansion
, which is not desirable for update in general, cf. [24] . On the other hand, (U8) says that if AE can be decomposed into a disjunction of states (e.g., models), then each case can be updated separately and the overall results are formed by taking the disjunction of the emerging states.
Iterated Revision Darwiche and Pearl [10] have proposed postulates for iterated revision, which can be rephrased in our setting as follows (we omit parentheses in sequences
Another set of postulates for iterated revision, corresponding to a sequence AE of observations, has been formulated by Lehmann [19] . Here each observation is a sentence which is assumed to be consistent (i.e., falsity is not observed), and the epistemic state AE has an associated belief set z ) l x { AE v . Lehmann's postulates read as follows, where
denote sequences of observations and "," stands for concatenation: , respectively). As for negation, we might interpret the condition
) in (K4) and (K8)) as satisfiability requirement for violates discriminating postulates such as (U2) for update and (K4) for revision. In the light of this, update programs neither have update nor revision flavor.
We remark that the picture does not change if we abandon extensional expansion and consider the postulates under intensional expansion. Thus, also under this view, update programs do not satisfy minimality of change.
The postulates (C1)-(C6) and (I1)-(I7) for iterated revision are treated in Table 2 . Concerning Lehmann's [19] postulates, (I3) is considered as the pendant to AGM postulate KÊ 3. In a literal interpretation of (I3), we may, since the belief language associated with GLPs does not have implication, consider the case where . Under this view, a new piece of information is incorporated into the belief set by producing a representation, ü "( 7 ý
, of the new belief set, where " B
. Here, (a set of) sentences from an extended belief language is used to characterize the new belief state, which is constructed by a nontrivial operation employing the semantics of logic programs. Thus, update programs enjoy to some extent also a logic-constrained revision flavor. Nonetheless, as also the failure of postulates shows, they are more an instance of immediate than logic-constrained revision. What we naturally expect, though, is that the two views described above amount to the same at a technical level. However, as we shall demonstrate below, this is not true in general.
Further Properties
Belief revision has been related in [14] 
Additionally, we can also identify some very elemental properties which, as we believe, updates and sequences of updates should satisfy. The following list of properties is not developed in a systematic manner, though, and is by no means exhaustive. Update programs do enjoy, unless stated otherwise, these properties. 
Addition of Tautologies
However, this property fails. Informally, soundness of this property would mean that a sequence of three updates is a shorthand for iterated update of a single program, i.e., the result of can be viewed as a shorthand for the nested case. Vice versa, this property reads as possibility to forget an update once and for all, by incorporating it immediately into the current belief set.
For a concrete counterexample, consider & B y 
7
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has the single stable model Clearly every strict stable model is minimal, but not vice versa. Unsurprisingly, minimal and strict stable models do not satisfy AGM minimality of change.
The trade-off for epistemic appeal is higher computational complexity than for arbitrary stable models.
) be the set of beliefs induced by the collection of minimal (resp., strict) 
Similar results have been derived by Inoue and Sakama [17] . The complexity results imply that minimal and strict stable models can be polynomially translated into disjunctive logic programming, which is currently under investigation.
Strong negation Update programs can be easily extended to the setting of generalized extended logic programs (GELPs), which have besides 8 9 also strong negation Ï as in [21] 
Related Work
Dynamic logic programming Recall that our update programs syntactically redefine dynamic logic programs for update in [2, 5] , which generalize the idea of updating interpretations through revision programs [22] . As we feel, they more transparently reflect the working behind this approach. The major difference between our update programs and dynamic logic programs is that the latter determine the values of atoms from the bottom level & 
Conversely, linear inheritance programs yield the same result as update programs in the extension with classical negation. . In Step 2, the answer sets of are computed using priorities, where rules of have higher priority than rules of . This approach is different from ours. It is in the spirit of the possible models approach [24] , which updates models of a propositional theory separately, thus satisfying the update postulate U8. However, like in Inoue and Sakama's approach, rules are not removed on the basis of causal rejection. In particular, the same result is obtained on the example there. 
Conclusion
We have considered the approach to updating logic programs based on dynamic logic programs [2, 3] and investigated various properties of this approach. Comparing it to other approaches and related work, we found that it is equivalent to a fragment of inheritance programs in [9] .
Several issues remain for further work. A natural issue is the inverse of addition, i.e. retraction of rules from a logic program. Dynamic logic programming evolved into LUPS [3] , which is a language for specifying update behavior in terms of addition and retraction of sets of rules to a logic program. LUPS is generic, however, as in principle, different approaches to updating logic programs could provide the semantical basis for an update step. Exploring properties of the general framework, as well as of particular such instantiations, would be worthwhile. Furthermore, reasoning about update programs describing the behavior of agents programmed in LUPS is an interesting issue.
Another issue are postulates for update operators on logic programs and, more generally, on nonmonotonic theories. As we have seen, several postulates from the area of logical theory change fail for dynamic logic programs (see [8] for related observations). This may partly be explained by nonmonotonicity of stable semantics and the dominant role of syntax for update embodied by causal rejection. However, similar features are not exceptional in the context of logic programming. It would be interesting to know further postulates and desiderata for update of logic programs besides the ones considered here, and an AGM style characterization of update operators compliant with them.
